Iraq-five years on: the polish perspective

Poland’s decission to join the „coalition of the willing” has left the military stretched beyond their capacity, the society in serious doubt of real intentions of their leaders and the perception of a joint effort for a good cause seriously damaged. It took 5 years and 3 governments to rethink and withdraw.
With more than 15 000 troops in 10 tours of duty so far Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) remains the largest military effort undertaken by the armed forces of the independent polish state (twice as many troops took part in the 1968 Czechoslovakia invasion, but that was not subject to a sovereign decission). This effort is due to terminate later this year, as the PM Donald Tusk promised withdrawal of the polish contingent and president Lech Kaczynski signed orders which allow for use of the polish forces in Iraq until October the 31st 2008.
Little time though is being spent today on debating the Iraq war. The issue fell victim to more politically „exciting” and actual questions, like the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and notably Afghanistan, which was in deep shadow of Iraq for too much time. More analysis on costs and gains of the mission will surely come later, as the withdrawal deadline approaches. So far no serious analytical project on OIF has been launched nor is under preparation. Observers have to rely on media reports, think-tank debates and public opinion polls. This article summarises only main streams of discussion with hope that others contributors will add their countries’ perspectives and comments.
Wrong war
Poland’s engagement in Iraq was based on two pillars: the notion of fulfilling the strategic bilateral alliance with the US and a similar duty to the international community[1]. Both the US decission to attack and the UN S.C. resolution 1441 were based on assumption that Iraq posesses weapons of mass destruction and supports terrorist organisations like Al.-Kaida. The first was admitted by the CIA to be wrong, the latter is probably never to be firmly proven. Poland’s leaders quoted allied intelligence sources and the allies reasurements of Iraq’s wrongdoing and lethal danger as grounds for their decission to go to war. It took them more than 3 years to admit they were misled and deceived but they didn’t immediately decide to order troops home, arguing it might leave the polish AOR in bloodshed.
Poland’s public opinion was strongly against the war from the very beginning and that stance did not change through years. Yet the leaders argued it is right to go against the anti-war mood for the national interests’s sake. This position changed only recently or – more precisely – the national interest changed in view of the current leaders. It is now in the national interest to withdraw.
Little gains
It is perhaps due to asessment of what Poland gained on the mission that the perception of national interest in relation to Iraq has changed. The aim of maintaining and strenghtening the bilateral strategic relation with the US has failed. The graphic proof for that is the planned missile defence deployment, where Poland is desperately trying to secure some hardware or financial guarantees for strenghtening its defence capabilities with little positive response so far from their American counterparts. And there are more sticking points: the US did not manage to ease visa regime for Poles and it did not persuade Lockheed-Martin to fulfill the offset program agreed upon purchase of the F-16’s. But most striking example of Poland’s imparity in regard to Iraq is that no significant business oportunity nas been created for the polish industry – a clear breach of promises made by the polish leaders on behalf of Americans. The costs of Iraq deployment on the polish side – as high as a billion dollars – have been put solely on the polish taxpayers.
Military experience
On the gains side the iraqi mission can be seen as a major testground for both line units, supplies, logistics and command structures. It is subject to further complex analysis how well did the polish army do in that test, but what should be said is that the reality of war in Iraq has been quite far away from what the operation was planned for. The need for amendments in equipment, structure, training and command have become apparent already in the course of the first tour of duty. As the situation on ground changed and the troops were gaining experience – they have constantly appealed for extra capabilities. These have been not only costly but sometimes just beyond reach of the polish military – and Americans have not always helped, being overstretched themselves. Shortages in equipment, vulnerability of supplies and lack of experience in commanding a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-language force had a damaging effect. In result the polish AOR has shrunk as did the number of troops under the polish command. The goals of the mission have evolved from peace-enforcement and stabilization to training and again to peace-enforcement, which reflected deterioration of the situation on the ground. Questions are being raise whether polish troops withdrawing from Diwanyia will leave it in better shape than it was when they arrived. As it became clear there is much more to do in Afghanistan for NATO troops, Poland realised it can not be involved in two such operations at a time. It has neither capabilities nor enough troops to do that. Hence the choice has been made to leave Iraq and focus on Afghanistan.
Public distrust
It is worth reminding that both decissions – on going hand in hand with the Americans in pursuit of Al.-Kaida in Afghanistan and to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq – have been taken without a wider consultation. It was the post-communist government of PM Leszek Miller and former career apparatchik, the then president Aleksander Kwasniewski who formally agreed in June 2003 for sending troops to Iraq. They used wide pro-american sentiment, still lingering after unprecedented, solidarity-driven, whole-hearted and emotional reaction to the events of 11th September 2001. Poland was regarded as a „true ally” by the US and a staunch supporter of somewhat oversized (for its global position) war on terror policy adopted by G.W. Bush, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. That sentiment was also boosted by huge PR and media campaign by the US government officials and private sector launched by the selection of a multi-role aircraft for the polish airforce. The contract worth 3.5 bn USD was granted to the US company Lockheed-Martin in late December 2002 and in 2003 Poland seemed to be still under the spell-bound of the Fort Worth wizards. Yet that spell-bound dissappeared quickly as polish boys were coming back in coffins and families of the fallen were left on their own. The military was proved unprepared to heal the human costs of the expedition. In result the pro-war lobby which led Poland to Iraq is suffering deep public distrust. The post-communist party, responsible for sending troops to Iraq was defeated in two general elections since and is merely marginalised[2]. Mr Kwasniewski, who tried to return to domestic politics, has failed to rally support. The right-wing conservatives who supported keeping the mission lost the last general election to a moderate center-right, whose leaders maintain that Poland fulfilled its mission and has well deserved the right to leave.
Making foes
Tense times came as Poland agreed to go hand in hand with Americans into Iraq. Most famous example of how furious some european leaders were is the quote by the French president Jaques Chirac, who did not hesitate to blast Poland for „not using the chance to sit quiet” – after it emerged that PM Leszek Miller was among the 8 who signed a letter in support of the US policy in March 2003. It took a few years for Chirac to apologise and it took even longer for Poland to restore the quality of relations with France, Belgium and Germany, the strongest opponents of the US-led invasion. Russia condemned Iraq operation outright and it did not have to condemn Poland separately as Warsaw-Moscow relations were approaching its all-time lows, with Iraq being by far not the only cause for that. Surely, keeping on the American side complicated Poland’s position within the EU in the early stage of its membership and made it more difficult for diplomacy to negotiate important EU matters. The term of „new Europe”, once used by Donald Rumsfeld, has not helped.
Balance sheet
Poland is to withdraw from Iraq by the end of October this year. The balance-sheet of the operation will be made by relevant ministries, the general staff of the armed forces and operational command. From what was said and revealed until now it is justified to conclude that Poland did not gain much on OIF. Whether it did loose, that remains to be analysed in detail. As it seems however, the current asessment of OIF makes further such decissions more difficult, if not impossible.

© MS, 2008

[1] Formal ground for sending troops to war was resolution 1441 of the UN Security Council
[2] I am not claiming that the war issue was decisive, I would argue though it was important